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Chapter 18

Property and Business
Bas van der Vossen
[10644]

Property rights define the economy. Economic exchange lies at the core of commercial activity.
We trade real property and we exchange manufactured objects, services, intellectual goods, and
other things. These forms of exchange are organized around, and made possible by, the parties’
property rights. These rights specify our prior holdings, the forms of exchange into which we can
enter, and they protect what we might get out of the exchange. They define and protect the
consumer’s purchase, the producer’s income, and the exchange itself. And a settled system of
property determines when economic activity creates problematic externalities, what might be the
appropriate scope of regulation, what are the limits of acceptable tax policy, and so on.

Any theory of business ethics must, therefore, contend with the idea of property. If business itself
is organized around property, a theory of how business ought to be done will presuppose a
certain view of property rights. While all (must) accept that a system of private property exists,
not all will agree on the moral qualities of that system. Whereas some shareholder theorists have
suggested, famously, that businesses ought to maximize their profits in accordance to what their
private possessions allow, stakeholder theorists have challenged this view by pointing out that
the moral demands on businesses go beyond what a private property economy allows. The
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viability of these, and other, theories of business ethics will depend in part on their fit with the
best theories of property.

This chapter gives an overview of the main foundational theories of property. As I will show,
there are two major families of justification for property (with each family, of course, having
many different members). After laying out those two families and their potential problems, I will
then consider some of the issues that reside in intellectual property, turning subsequently to
explore one way in which a theory of business ethics may either be in tension or fit with such a
justification of property. In particular, I will look at the tensions that stakeholder theory, on at
least one version of that theory, might create.

Forms of Ownership

Before we turn to the justifications of property, however, we should begin to reflect on what
property is. What’s the nature of property, and private property in particular?

Property rights are complex. Even a relatively simple form of ownership such as the possession
of a car can be violated or negated in a variety of ways. Your car can be stolen or damaged, you
can be prevented from using it, you can be prohibited from selling it or giving it away, your car
can be wrongfully expropriated by the government, and so on. Each of these violates or negates
your property rights. But they affect your ownership in very different ways.
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We can put this in more technical terms, using the Hohfeldian analysis of rights (Hohfeld 1919).1
When someone steals or damages your car, they thereby deny your claim-right to exclude them
from your possessions. When you are wrongfully prevented from using your car, this denies your
liberty to use what you own. When the law prohibits a sale, it thereby denies your power to
transfer your rightful possessions to others. And when the government wrongfully expropriates
you, it thereby violates your immunity against having your rights unilaterally altered or
extinguished.

Systems of private property standardly afford owners all these elements of ownership. However,
this analysis masks a still greater complexity. Property rights confer different kinds of liberties,
claims, powers, and immunities on owners. We can have rights to possess, use, or manage our
property, rights to the income we can garner using it, rights to the capital that the property
represents, and so on (Honore 1961). These rights will involve several kinds of Hohfeldian
incidents. The right to possess, for example, will typically involve both the claim-right to
exclude and the immunity against expropriation. A right to the income one can make using
property will typically involve the power to (temporarily) transfer the property to others, or the
right to use the property, in exchange for payment, as well as other rights protecting this power
(such as, again, the claim-right to exclude and the immunity against having these rights
annulled).

There is great variation among different legal regimes in how rights to property are organized.
The law can recognize, alter, or abridge various claim-rights, liberties, powers, and immunities
with respect to different parts and aspects of ownership. One might thus have the liberty to grow
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crops on one’s land, but lack the liberty to build a structure without a permit. An owner may
have a claim that others not trespass on his property, but also be subject to an easement which
gives others the liberty to walk across the property in designated places. One may have the
power to transfer, but not be immune from government expropriation through eminent domain.
One can be a partial or shared owner, as a shareholder in a firm. One can be a conditional owner,
as the holder of a mortgage-backed security. The list goes on.

Some philosophers have concluded from this complexity that there is no “core” to property
rights. Instead, it is said, property rights are like a bundle of sticks, with each stick representing
one of these many possible incidents. But the bundle can be put together in many different ways,
and none of the sticks is really essential. As long as the bundle is recognizable as a property
right, any one incident (or stick) may be present or absent. (Grey 1980)

Others have challenged this thought. Some say that, while no particular incident is essential, at
least the presence of certain incidents requires the presence of others (Attas 2006). Others
maintain a stronger view and say that some incidents really are the “core” of property. Perhaps,
for example, the right to exclude is practically unavoidable if property rights are to function as
they should (Schmidtz 2011). As John Locke famously writes in section 138 of The Second
Treatise: “I have truly no Property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he
pleases, against my consent.” (Locke 1988 [1698])

This dispute (regarding the bundle versus core theories) matters for the broader moral relevance
of property rights, including for theories of business ethics. To the extent that property lacks a
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common core, it will be more difficult to argue that a policy, legal regime, or moral theory is in
conflict with it. After all, as long as the theory does not altogether negate rights of possession,
there will be some form of property with which it is consistent. And one form is as good as any.
On the other hand, if Locke is right that property rights must empower owners to exclude others,
such objections can have real force.

It is important here to distinguish between two questions. One question is whether the presence
of any particular incident is necessary for any given right to qualify as a property right. Another,
and quite independent, question is whether the presence of any particular incident is necessary
for a system to qualify as a system of property rights.

With respect to the first question, it may well be plausible that no particular incident is necessary
for a given right to qualify as a property right. Rights of ownership may be composed and
decomposed in myriad ways. One reason for a specific configuration of a property right is
government regulation. Private ownership of nature preserves, for example, is typically heavily
curtailed to prevent forms of use, exploitation, and change of the land. Another reason is private
contract. Suppose you take out a mortgage with a bank to buy a house. The bank can transform
the mortgage loan into collateralized debt obligations, making a number of entities the shared
owner of your house in the event of your nonpayment. All of these effectively unpack what was
once a thick bundle of incidents into several separate sticks.

Answering this first question in the negative, however, does not mean we must answer the
second in the negative as well. For it is possible that any recognizable property system must have
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certain general or recurrent features, even if the rights within that system need not all share those
features.

As we will see below, it is very plausible that for a system of property to be acceptable or
justified, it will have to contain a number of regularly occurring features. But even at the
conceptual level, it is true that any recognizable system of property will have certain regularly
occurring features. The rights with which we began are good initial candidates. A society that
generally abolishes or even heavily curtails people’s rights to exclude others, to use their
possessions, and their powers to enter into economic exchange, has not just changed one form of
property into another. It will have effectively abolished it altogether. And, by extension, a theory
of business ethics that seriously undercuts the ability of owners to exclusively hold and
determine the use of their possessions will be in clear tension with private property as well. In
this sense, the features of use, exclusion, and exchange form the “core” of property.

Two Kinds of Justification

This point about the rights to use, exclude, and transfer is conceptual in nature. It claims only
that an economic system recognizable as a system of property will generally contain these rights.
It leaves open, of course, whether or not there should be such a system. This latter question is
one of justification.

Roughly speaking, justifications of property rights can be grouped into two kinds. The first offers
a justification that moves from persons to property, so to speak. Here we begin by identifying
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something of moral importance about owners or their connection to the particular thing that is
owned, and we end up with a view about why their property rights should be respected. The
second kind moves in the opposite direction. Here, the justification begins with something of
importance about rights of ownership and tries to deduce the morally important status of
individuals as owners from this.

From Person to Property

Arguments that adopt the first approach attempt to ground rights of ownership in some morally
important fact or feature about the owner. On this view, a justified system of property consists of
rights that ought to be respected because they directly represent morally relevant facts about
owners.

No doubt this is highly abstract. Consider, then, the most famous version of this argument. In
chapter V of The Second Treatise, Locke argues that property rights come about as the result of
people working on things that were previously unowned (Locke 1988 [1698]). Suppose there is a
piece of land which no one has appropriated yet, and you clear it, till it, and plant some crops.
The result, Locke argued, is that you not only own the crops you produce, but the land as well.
By laboring, you appropriate.

There is considerable controversy about precisely why Locke thought that laboring constitutes
appropriation. Most commentators focus heavily on section 27, where Locke writes that laboring
involves the “mixing” of something one already owns (one’s labor) with something unowned
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(the land), thereby pulling the unowned into the sphere of what is owned. This is probably the
most straightforward version of the from-person-to-property approach. It sees appropriation as
quite literally the extension of the (already owned) self into the (previously unowned) external
world.

On this reading, the Lockean view is that we ought to respect property because it represents
previously performed labor. If you steal a car you are taking someone’s work without consent. If
you prevent them from using their car, you are denying them the ability to enjoy what they
worked for. If you block exchange you prohibit free and equal persons from disposing of their
labor as they please. In each case, to violate a property right means violating (the extension of) a
person’s rights over her person.

Other arguments for property take a similar form. Compare G.W. F. Hegel’s view that the
ultimate foundation of property lies not in the respect for mixed labor, but the recognition of
others’ free wills. (Hegel 1967 [1821]) Hegel saw property rights as protecting the physical
imprint an autonomous will makes on the external world – the objective manifestation of
subjects. When we plan, say, to cultivate some land, carrying out that plan requires changes to
the world. Property rights, on this Hegelian view, protect the physical manifestation of our wills
in the external world. As such, they make our freely chosen plans practically possible.

On Hegel’s view, to violate someone’s property rights, then, is to interfere with their
autonomous plans, and thus their ability to live freely by their own will. Contrary to Locke, who
saw property as the extension of our physical selves, Hegel sees property as the extension of our
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mental selves. Instead of connecting property with labor, he connects it with our will or
autonomy.

Both Locke and Hegel adopt a person-to-property approach in that they see the moral
significance of property rights as directly based in some morally significant fact about individual
owners. The justification of property rights, in other words, derives from normatively significant
features of the persons who do or can possess them. For Locke, property rights protect our labor
from being taken away by others. For Hegel, property rights protect our will from being
interfered with by others.

Theories that take this approach have many attractions. One advantage is that they promise a
very solid foundation for property rights. The rights over our bodies, labor, and the exercise of
our autonomy or free will are all widely accepted. Given the controversial nature of disputes that
invoke property rights – such as disputes over taxation, economic regulation, or the moral limits
of for-profit enterprise – such a solid grounding is more than welcome.

Another advantage is that these views offer a clear mechanism for distinguishing legitimate from
illegitimate forms of property. Suppose person P holds object O and we wish to know if P is
justified in claiming O as his property. All we need to do is find out whether P mixed his labor or
will with O, or whether O was legitimately transferred to P by someone else who had a rightful
claim to O. If the answer is yes, then P has a right to O. If not, then P’s claim to O is void.2
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Unfortunately, the person-to-property approach also suffers from some well-known and
recurring problems. For one, views of this kind seem poorly suited to justifying anything close to
what we would intuitively recognize as at least potentially legitimate holdings. That is, the theory
will fail to recognize as legitimate numerous cases in which there really does seem to be a
genuine property right. And it may identify cases as involving genuine property rights where
there really seem to be none. Put more precisely, the kinds of property-grounding facts or
features on which this approach relies seem to be neither necessary nor sufficient for genuine
property rights.

Consider these in turn. First, there are numerous examples where real property rights seem to
exist, yet there is no direct connection to the owner’s labor, will, or what have you. One example
is the filing of a patent by a pharmaceutical corporation that has created a certain chemical
compound. These bring about a property right, but it seems quite beside the point to say that this
represents the corporation’s mixing its labor with or extending its free will into the external
world. After all, the point of the patent is to protect the idea or invention more than some
particular physical object.3

Of course the friend of the person-to-property approach might insist here that patents ought to be
abolished anyway. But many other standard cases of ownership suffer from the same problems.
Imagine, for instance, a system of acquisition by which people become owners by submitting a
deed application to a local registry. Or consider something like a finders-keepers rule according
to which those who happen upon an object or resource become the owner, such as through
“telepossession”, the appropriation of sunken treasure through the use of remote video cameras.4
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There seems to be no meaningful way in which these cases involve the mixing of labor or the
extending of a free will.5

Second, just as the person-to-property connection is not necessary for genuine property rights to
exist, it also not sufficient. Consider again Locke’s suggestion of labor-mixing. As Robert
Nozick (generally a follower of Locke) has famously pointed out, it cannot be true that mixing
what one owns with what is unowned leads to the unowned becoming owned. Nozick’s example
involves pouring a can of tomato juice into the ocean. Even if I own the tomato juice, and even
though the ocean belongs to nobody, I lose the tomato juice – I do not gain the ocean. Examples
like this abound. You might spill some paint on a rock, you might dump waste in a forest, you
might go for a hike and leave your backpack on a log. In such cases (good or bad), we seem to
introduce things that are owned into things that are unowned. Yet, contrary to what Locke’s
labor mixing-argument would seem to imply, the result is not the extension of ownership, but its
loss.

The problem these cases pose for person-to-property approaches is that they seem incapable of
offering a principled distinction between instances of appropriation and instances of waste,
abandonment, or loss. As far as labor-mixing (or Hegelian will-extending) is concerned,
appropriation, spillage, and abandonment all look the same. But this simply is not a plausible
conclusion.

The point that these problems raise is a general one. Property rights can exist in the presence or
absence of morally significant facts about owners. And people can possess these significant facts
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with or without enjoying property rights. The person-to-property approach thus fails to line up
correctly its justifying account with the actual property rights that need justification.

The stories I have recounted here are, of course, vast simplifications of the actual arguments
offered by Locke and Hegel. And other versions of these stories can be told, too. Some of these
will no doubt be more plausible than the ones I have just told. A Hegelian might say, for
instance, that since the exercise of our autonomy or free will requires interaction with the
physical and social world, the point of property is to enable or guarantee to us that ability. A
Lockean might point out that property rights matter not just because of particular laboring acts,
but because they protect and encourage the kind of productive activity that labor represents.

Such variations certainly fit the spirit of these arguments, and I agree they are more plausible.
There may even be grounds for interpreting Hegel’s and Locke’s own views along these lines.
But note that these stories involve a crucial reversal of the direction of justification. For these
reconstructions no longer attempt to show that all justified property rights directly represent a
connection with the owner. Instead, they aim to show that a system of property in general does
something that is morally important. The rights of individual owners are morally significant
because the system as a whole has morally significant features. This is the second approach to
justifying property.

From Property to Person
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Arguments that adopt this second approach typically take as their starting point the function or
purpose fulfilled by a system of property rights. The conclusions they derive about the moral
standing of individual property holders are defended as best fitting this function. On this more
systemic view, then, property rights are primarily seen as things that are meant to solve a
problem. The moral significance of property rights follows from the ways in which they solve
those problems. As such, this approach reasons from ideas about the system of property as such
to the rights of individuals.

We can illustrate this second approach by drawing an analogy, perhaps more familiar to students
of business ethics, from the law and economics literature. One standard defense of shareholders’
property rights in corporations argues that a number of potential problems that can plague firms
are best (or most efficiently) solved by creating a relation of fiduciary care to shareholders
(Hansmann 1996). Here, too, the justification of ownership is supposed to follow from an
argument about the social desirability of its function.6

This approach traces back to at least David Hume. For Hume, the system of property overcomes
two important problems. First, we naturally find ourselves in a condition of “moderate scarcity”.
That is, while there is (or can be) enough for all of us to survive and even live prosperously,
there is not enough for all of us to just get whatever we want. Second, when dealing with this
scarcity, we do not care for other people quite as much as we care for ourselves. Our capacity for
altruism is limited.
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In a world without property rights, these two problems are very severe indeed. When the world’s
resources are available in common, one person’s gain necessarily means another person’s loss.
When I take a bushel of wheat from the commons, what is available to you has decreased. And if
the commons do not produce enough for all of us to be satisfied, and we all look out for
ourselves first, we are facing a toxic situation. Every person’s attempts at providing for his or her
own needs threatens the like ability of others.

This kind of zero-sum world is something we have reason to avoid. Commonly held resources
tend to suffer from collective action problems, sometimes called the “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin 1968). The tragedy is that, while each person has reason to keep the commonly held
resource intact, each has an incentive to overuse the resource. Our combined actions thus
predictably lead to the destruction of the resource. The logic of the problem is similar to that of a
prisoners’ dilemma (only worse because of the increased number of players). Because no
individual has the ability to exclude others from the resource, no individual has control over how
the resource is used overall. The resulting uncertainty about the total use of the resource creates
incentives for each individual to maximize his use of the resource, thereby leading, predictably,
to the destruction of that resource.

Let’s make this concrete. Think about your options as someone who shares access to the
resource. One option is to restrict your use to a level that would help preserve the resource for
later. Of course this means forgoing some benefit now, but that may be worth it since preserving
things can offer a lot of benefits later. But this is very dangerous. For others may not similarly
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restrict their use, leading to the resource being depleted anyway. And that would be a terrible
outcome as you lose both the future benefits and the benefits you are thinking of forgoing.

So here is your other option. You can avoid this terrible outcome by maximizing your own use of
the resource. Probably this will not matter much anyway. If others end up restricting their use,
your overuse will likely not destroy the resource. And if others do not restrict their use, at least
you got yours. It seems, then, that your choice is pretty clear – whatever the others might do, you
should use as much of the resource as possible.

The tragedy of the commons is that everyone is in this position. Everyone is incentivized to
overuse a commonly held resource. As a result, commonly held resources – and the livelihood
they might represent for users – tend to be depleted, mismanaged, or otherwise destroyed. The
situation is such that if each does what is good for him or her, the outcome will be bad for
everyone. Individually rational behavior leads to collectively irrational outcomes.

Frequently, environmental problems are a result of tragedies of the commons. David Schmidtz
(1994) discusses a case involving the unregulated fishing of coral reefs in the Philippine and
Tongan Islands. Because each fisherman has an incentive to overfish, and cannot reduce their
own fishing with the assurance that others will do the same, they all end up overfishing. The
result is the destruction of the reef and the fishermen’s livelihood it represents. The same
dynamic contributes to other problems, such as the cutting down of rainforests, or humanity’s
inability to reduce carbon emissions. (For discussion of these problems and the role property can
play in solving them, see Schmidtz and Willott, 2008)
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The key function of property rights (and, for Hume, justice more generally) is to avoid this kind
of world of rival and zero-sum interactions and to create a world where our interactions are
mutually beneficial or positive-sum in nature. Systems of property avoid the zero-sum world,
and therefore the tragedy of the commons, because they allow individuals to use and exclude
others from their possessions. Since each person has the right to use only his or her discrete part
of the world, one person’s rightful use no longer reduces what is available to others.

Suppose, then, that the resource in question is a forest whose trees are used for lumber. If the
forest is commonly owned, individual users have reason to cut down so many trees as to destroy
the forest. But if they split up the forest into discrete parcels, each owner can control how many
trees are cut down on his or her lot. Consequently, it makes sense for them to cut down only so
many trees as are renewable over time.

Second, property rights foster mutually beneficial interactions. Since we need people’s
permission to use what is theirs, they will typically allow such use only if they think it in their
interest. If you want some of my lumber, I might ask for some of your wheat in return. As a
result, your use of my land no longer diminishes but enhances my ability to provide for my
needs. Property systems thus encourage positive-sum or mutually beneficial interactions.

Of course, property rights need not be unique in this sense. Other solutions to tragedies of the
commons can be imagined, and some have actually worked in practice too. Because fish that
travel great distances cannot be confined within an owner’s lot, it is hard to see how assigning
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property rights over the oceans, say, might help to avoid overfishing. And sometimes it can make
sense for communities to want to manage certain resources together.

That being said, cases in which these alternative solutions succeed are more exception than rule.
Successful collective resource management is rare and fragile (Ostrom 1990). And most
resources do not swim away like fish. What is more, even if they do, property systems can
develop sophisticated responses.7 There is no sense is claiming that property is the only solution
humanity might invent to the tragedy of the commons. But there is little more sense in denying
that it is by far the most effective response that has proven to be useful in a widespread way.

From the point of view of a moral justification for property, the following two points matter
most. First, systems of private property contain far greater economic promise than their rivals.
They promise, that is, to do more than just maintain the stock of resources. Because owners
know that they may be able to reap the full benefits of their holdings, ownership incentivizes
them to invest time and money and increase the resource’s total productivity, for example by
removing the underbrush, fighting common diseases, protecting one’s lot against potential
poachers who might cut trees at unsustainable rates, and so on.

The first argument for private property, then, is that it avoids a world in which all or most of our
resources are subject to tragedies of the commons, and replaces it with one in which exclusionary
rights lead to productive benefits. Life under an economic system characterized by property thus
promises standards of living that are vastly superior to life under non-propertied systems.
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Second, a much less commonly recognized justification offered by these arguments is more
theoretical in nature. When people’s livelihoods depend on what they can extract from
commonly held resources, the achievement of their goals, ambitions, even their very survival
come to be in conflict. To use again the example above, because person A’s cutting down of
trees to sell for lumber means there is less for B to cut down, A’s livelihood necessarily comes at
the expense of B’s, and vice versa.

When social relations are zero-sum in this way, conflict looms. The threat of conflict is not
simply an immediate hazard of physical confrontation (although, at the limit, fighting does loom)
but a more philosophical sense of conflict—including fundamental disagreements over values,
aims, and desires—that threatens the very possibility of justice. Though not much of a defender
of property, John Rawls famously emphasized that a just society is a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage (Rawls 1999 [1971]: ch. 2, sec. 14), a place in which our ends become
mutually reinforcing rather than rival. Leaving resources in common possession pushes us in
quite the opposite direction.8

Property rights thus help create the conditions of justice by dividing the social world into discrete
parcels. As a result, A’s use of the resources available to A does not reduce the resources
available to B. Stronger still, since if A wants to use B’s resources, A will need to secure B’s
permission, such use will require terms that B considers in his interest to accept. The effect is
that A’s interaction with B will be to their mutual advantage.
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Here, then, we find the second version of the property-to-persons argument. Individual owners
can rightfully insist on their property rights because these rights are essential components of a
harmonious and just social order. Because owners are authorized to make decisions about their
several possessions, property rights express the moral demand that people must enter into such
mutually acceptable relations.

This second property-to-person argument, then, adds something crucial to the first. The
justification of property lies not only in the avoidance of tragedies of the commons, but in how
property systems avoid them.

Note, finally, that while these arguments cannot conceive of property as an extension of the
person, they can capture at least part of the intuition that ownership is a deeply personal affair.
For our holdings represent personal projects, sacrifices, and decisions. We put time, effort, and
ideas in our work, all of which is represented by the money we make. The numbers on our
401(k) slip may look like mere numbers, but they represent past sacrifices and future plans or
goals. Whenever property rights are infringed, whether it be by other people or the government,
we are directed affected in intimate and personal ways. In this sense, then, there is an immediate
connection between respecting people, their work, and their choices, and respecting their
possessions.

The Conventionalist Objection
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Both the person-to-property and the property-to-person approaches aim to show that property
rights are among our basic moral rights. On either view, property rights pose genuine moral
demands similar to other important moral rights, such as rights over our bodies, our rights to
freedom of action, belief, and speech.9

The very idea that property rights are fully fledged moral rights has been subjected to several
critiques. Some of these, such as Marxist critiques, seek to reject property altogether, or even
object to the very idea that people might possess rights. (Marx 1978 [1844]) The worry behind
these arguments is that rights in general, and property in particular, put people in antagonistic
relations to one another, relations that are inimical to our living together in justice and harmony.

Less radical critiques accept that property might play an important role in society, but reject their
moral foundations. According to these arguments, property rights are not among our basic moral
rights, but mere conventions or legal creations. And as such, they are more malleable. They can
be altered, interpreted, determined, taken away, reallocated, and strongly curtailed by the law
without moral problem. Because this challenge sees property rights as mere conventions or legal
creations, I label it the conventionalism-charge. (See e.g. Murphy and Nagel 2004; Donaldson
and Preston 1995)

The upshot of the conventionalist objection is best understood in terms of a point about the order
of justification. Suppose we ask what justice requires for the distribution of material goods in
society. A number of things will go into answering that question. For instance, one might want
the distribution to be consistent with everyone having good opportunities in life, with everyone
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having enough to avoid living in desperate circumstances, with some kind of equality obtaining,
and with people being free to choose their occupations.

Let us call these the “inputs” of distributive justice, the basic ingredients that go into bringing
together a full view of what justice might demand. The two approaches to justifying property
discussed above see people’s property rights as figuring among these inputs. That is, if achieving
a just distribution is a question of people’s opportunities, living standards, or equality, it is also a
question of respecting people’s property. Property, we might say, is among the premises in a
longer argument about distributive justice.

The conventionalist objection seeks to reverse this order. It sees property rights as mere legal or
conventional allocations, the justice of which depends on how they conform to the (different)
inputs of justice. Those inputs express the demands of justice – they are the premises in the
argument – and property is what we end up with once those principles are correctly applied – it is
what rolls out of such an argument. However, the objection goes, because property rights
function as the conclusion of a logically prior (and independent) argument about distributive
justice, they themselves cannot be invoked to protest against policies of taxation, redistribution,
and the like. To do so would be to make a simple mistake.

The conventionalist objection is more often asserted than defended. But its intuitive appeal is not
hard to see. Any introduction to property law shows just how complicated and sophisticated the
legal rules of property can – and need to – get. And this sophistication is hard to imagine without
an equally complicated, sophisticated, and detailed legal system or state. Thus, the charge goes,
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property is something created by the law, not something pre-existing that it must protect and
enforce.

This objection can be made more precise in slightly different ways. The lesson against person-toproperty arguments, for example, is said to be that these justifications are radically incomplete.
There is simply no way, it seems, in which we can derive such complicated and detailed views
about property from arguments about individuals’ mixing their labor, extending their free wills,
and so on. As a result, these arguments cannot support actual property rights. (See e.g. Fried
2004; Railton 1985.)

Similarly, and contrary to property-to-person arguments, the charge holds that the benefits of
property are really the result of a well-functioning state. Without a state, we lack the detailed
solutions and enforcement needed to avoid tragedies of the commons, resolve conflicts, and
promote productivity. But if the state is itself central to property rights fulfilling their function in
the first place, then those rights cannot be coherently claimed against that legal system. Property,
again, is a mere convention. (Murphy and Nagel 2004)

Despite their initial appeal, the conventionalism charge is deeply problematic. While it is
plausible that the philosophical arguments above are insufficient by themselves to settle all
potential property disputes, this does not defeat them as justifications for property rights. These
are philosophical theories, and were never intended to resolve all practical problems with which
the law deals. Asking them to do so would surely be asking too much of philosophical theories.
Instead, their point is to identify moral boundaries within which a just legal system can specify,

22

23
interpret, and settle our property rights. These theories aim to identify a scheme of justification
within which a legal system can appeal to concrete facts to make particular judgments and
evolve legal principles implementing the general scheme of justification.10

This feature is not unique to property. Consider other standard liberal rights, such as our rights to
free movement, free speech, privacy, and more. The precise contours of these rights, too, are not
derivable from their philosophical justifications. Different legal systems can protect, say, the
right to free speech in different ways without injustice. This version of the conventionalism
charge thus seems to prove too much. It threatens not only property rights, but liberal rights in
general. (As such, it is closer to the more radical and less plausible Marxist objections.)

The upshot is that the conventionalism charge can simply be conceded as harmless, if not
irrelevant. The (obvious) fact that property rights need specification does not threaten their status
as important moral rights. It is one thing to say that a legal system backed up by a state is
necessary to specify property rights with the kind of detail that we need in practice. It is quite
another to say that property rights are entirely a creation of the law or state. Even if the former
claim is true – and it is an empirical matter whether it is true – the latter is not.

Intellectual Property

The discussion above has focused largely on ownership in tangible objects, such as land,
resources, companies, and the like. However, ownership of non-tangible things is becoming
increasingly important. Some of the largest and most valuable parts of the economy are
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organized around the existence and enforcement of patents and copyrights. Pharmaceutical
companies, the entertainment industry, and technological firms all heavily rely on the
enforcement of these rights.

The basic problem such forms of intellectual property are supposed to solve is not hard to see.
Most economically valuable ideas and applications are not easy to find. In order to develop, say,
a new kind of medication, large amounts of time, energy, and resources need to be invested.
However, once developed, the recipe and application of this new medication are easily copied by
others.

This creates a double-edged sword. On the one hand, since the marginal cost of applying and
reapplying the idea behind the medication is virtually zero, it can be very cheap to produce it in
large quantities. In this sense, the low cost of copying ideas is a boon, for it makes new
medication potentially available to lots of people at a very low price.

On the other hand, this also creates a problem of free-riding. If the marginal cost of producing
the medicine is very low, the price of the medication in a competitive market will be very low as
well. And this may make it impossible to recoup the (often significant) investment in researching
and developing the idea. As a result, companies will rationally avoid investing in the research
and development of new medication. Better to wait for others to come up with innovations, and
then copy them at low cost. Since all companies are in this position, few new kinds of
medication will be developed.
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Intellectual property rights, on their most popular defense, can strike an appropriate balance
between these two effects. By awarding to owners a temporary right to preclude others from
freely copying and using the idea, they achieve two things. First, they end the collective action
problem by creating an artificial monopoly for their creators. As monopolists, the holders of
intellectual property are in a position to demand higher prices in the market. Higher prices enable
them to recoup their investment and incentivizes the necessary research, development, and
creative activity. Second, when the intellectual property expires, the idea becomes publicly
available for commercial exploitation, thus enabling the availability of these goods at very low
prices under competitive conditions. The combination of these virtues will lead, so this defense
goes, to more and more ideas becoming freely available over time.

This argument is both similar to and subtly different from the argument that property rights serve
to avoid the tragedy of the commons. The argument is subtly different because those previous
arguments concerned the potential overuse of already existing resources. Property rights are
defended to overcome the scarcity of these resources. By contrast, the present argument concerns
the creation of new resources. Here scarcity is artificially created by protecting the ideas from
being copied.

Nevertheless, the motivation behind the two arguments is similar. Property in ideas, just as
property in tangible objects, aims at preventing the socially destructive use of valuable resources,
and increasing the stock of useful goods available to mankind. Whereas in the former case, the
problem concerns the overuse of already existing goods, in the latter case the problem concerns a
kind of overuse that makes the creation of the resource less likely.
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Intellectual property rights are highly controversial (as evidenced in a recent collection of essays,
Mossoff, 2013). One controversy concerns the practical use of these rights, and in particular their
duration. When the Copyright Act was first enacted in the United States, the duration of
copyright was fourteen years. Now, in some cases copyright protection can last over a century.
The reasons behind these extensions are often said to be less about the recouping of investments,
and more about companies’ lobbying Congress to keep in place their most profitable copyrights.

Other concerns about intellectual property rights focus on particular kinds of ideas. Consider new
kinds of medication that could, if made cheaply, save millions of people’s lives. Is there not
something perverse about large pharmaceutical companies charging high prices for these
products when the marginal cost of production is very low? Perhaps, then, we should exclude
things like life-saving medicine from the scope of patents.11

On its face, however, the proposal to allow patents for all but the most important ideas is
potentially disastrous. If the free-riding problem is real, and the free availability of ideas
discourages the investment of resources into their development, then this proposal will lead to
the production of all but the most important things. And this, of course, is precisely the opposite
of what we want. Even if there is something distasteful about artificially inflating the price of
this kind of medication – as there surely is – the alternative is far worse. (Compare Rosenberg
2004)
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It is worth nothing here that this line of reasoning has far-ranging implications for how we think
about property rights. For the concern that there is something bad about excluding people from
potentially life-saving resources is not unique to the case of patents. In fact, it is a perfectly
general feature of systems of property. All such systems, we saw, allow people to exclude others
from the things they possess, and at times the burdens for non-owners of being excluded can be
great.

It is important to avoid posing a false dilemma here. We are not faced with a choice of absolute
rights to exclude non-owners from our property come what may, or the abolition of the system of
property altogether. It is possible, for instance, to support a system of property while admitting
that there can be circumstances in which those rights may be justifiably infringed. Consider an
example. Suppose that your life is in danger, and you are in immediate need of medical attention.
And suppose that the only way you can make it to the hospital is to walk across my land. Even
though you may not be able to ask me for permission – indeed, even if I were to explicitly tell
you no – it is clearly permissible for you to cross my land.

But if my property rights cannot in general stand in the way of your survival, then the case for
patents to life-saving ideas would seem to be similarly imperiled. After all, if we can infringe
property rights in one case to save a life, why not also in the other? We live – tragically – in a
world in which there are quite literally always people whose lives could be saved if only the
requisite resources were available. So why not exempt life-saving medication from the patent
system?
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This challenge raises a question about the proper place and scope of exceptions. On the one
hand, it seems true that the very benefits that justify property rights in the first place require a
rule of exclusion. On the other hand, there do seem to be cases where exigent circumstances can
justify exceptions to this rule. How far can those exceptions reach before they overthrow the rule
and, with it, the entire practice?

The first step towards a solution is to realize that if the practice as a whole is to survive, we
cannot violate the rule for every possible exception. We can, and should, recognize exceptions
when important things like people’s lives are at stake, but only if such recognition is consistent
with upholding the more general rule of respect for property that makes saving lives possible in
the first place. This means that we cannot simply generalize the truth that property can give way
to emergencies into the falsehood that property rights cannot apply to potentially life-saving
goods.

Note, moreover, that nothing in this argument precludes companies or philanthropists using their
property rights in order to help people – or even it being morally desirable or required that they
use their property in such ways. Just as I can – and, if I reasonably can, then I should – agree to
let you cross my land to get to the hospital, so too wealthy parties can – and, if they reasonably
can, should – make patent-protected medication cheaply available. And indeed, there are
examples where companies do just this. Since 1987, Merck & Co Inc. has produced and
distributed over 2 billion treatments of the river blindness drug Mectizan around the world
without charge.
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A third and final challenge to intellectual property rights also focuses on potentially life-saving
medication, but focuses on a different problem. This objection, offered by Thomas Pogge (2002:
Ch. 9), holds that the patent system does not encourage the right kind of innovations. Since
patents encourage the production of medication because of the artificially high prices these will
command, the system incentivizes the production of medication for which the most purchasing
power exists. The system will thus likely be very good at producing, say, new kinds of skin
cream that helps rich Westerners avoid wrinkles, but bad at manufacturing the kinds of medicine
that would cure diseases that affect only the poorest. That is, while the patent system may well
lead to a greater total stock of goods, it may also fail to bring about the right kinds of goods.

Pogge has proposed an alternative regime for producing life-saving medicine, what he calls a
Health Impact Fund. The idea is to create a central fund out of which large awards could be paid
to companies that have a measurable impact on public health. Such a regime, Pogge argues,
would better encourage the production of medicine aimed at helping the poor. Indeed, because
companies get paid not just for inventing new kinds of medication, but for the impact these have
on public health, the Fund might improve the delivery of medication too.

One problem of Pogge’s proposal, Nobel-laureate Angus Deaton (2015: Ch. 7) points out, is that
it is very difficult to disentangle what precisely caused improvements in public health. When
improvements occur, they are usually the result of the interaction of many different factors,
making it hard to know which caused what. This is doubly true in very poor countries where
statistical measuring techniques are poor as well. As a result, a Health Impact Fund might not be
very good at matching its awards with products that genuinely improve public health.
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Another problem is analogous to the problems with patents identified by Pogge. While patents
incentivize companies to serve people in proportion to their aggregate purchasing power, a
Health Impact Fund would encourage companies to be seen or measured to have an impact. But
to be seen to have an effect is not the same as actually having a real impact. So where the patent
system might incentivize the development of luxury products, the Health Impact Fund creates a
different problem. It incentivizes companies to introduce their products in places where health
improvements are already imminent for other reasons, to manipulate statistics and other
measuring tools, and other ways of capturing the prize.

Concluding Remarks: Business and Property

Property rights are central to questions about business ethics. They constrain how we can
ethically run our own businesses, as well as treat the businesses of others. We must make sure
not to defraud, deceive, pollute, steal, or damage the possessions of others. And within those
limits, we must leave others free to run their businesses as they choose. The laws and regulations
for which businesses can ethically lobby must be consistent with property rights and their
justification.

There are differences in the degree to which theories of business ethics fit this idea of property.
At its most extreme, one might hold in the tradition of E. Merrick Dodd (1932) that control of a
corporation, say ought not to lie with the shareholders but with society at large. On such a view,
corporations are closer to public institutions that ought to be subject to standards of providing
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common benefits than private possessions that owners can use for their own gain. If, at the other
extreme, we follow Milton Friedman’s famous thought that the terms of business ethics are
largely set by the terms of private property, we might indeed say that “there is one and only one
social responsibility of business―to … increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of
the game” (Friedman 2002: 133).

On other views, the relation will be more complicated. Consider the following version of
stakeholder theory, which aims “to broaden management’s vision of its roles and responsibilities
to include interests and claims of non-stockholding groups”. (Mitchell et al. 1997: 855). On this
view, companies morally ought to take into consideration the interests of all the “groups and
individuals who benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by,
corporate actions” (Freeman 1998: 129).

The suggestion, here, is that managers have moral obligations take into account the interests of a
variety of groups that surround the firm. But consider the incentives that this creates. These will
include:

(a) An incentive to be among those who have a stake in how the firm acts,

(b) An incentive to maximize the extent of one’s stake,

(c) An incentive to prevent others from having or developing a stake in how the firm
acts, and
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(d) An incentive to minimize the extent of the stakes of others.

The rationale behind these incentives is the same throughout. The extent to which one stands to
gain from the way businesses operate depends on the size of one’s proportional stake. One gains
more, that is, the larger the numerator and the smaller the denominator of one’s share of the total
stake in the business’s operations. At the limit, the point at which one’s interests are served best,
the proportional size of one’s stake will be 1.

The incentives above mirror the different ways once can move in this direction. One can increase
the numerator by, first, making sure one is counted among the stakeholders. Once you are
counted, the business in question will have to serve your interests. Second, one can increase this
by maximizing the interests one has in how the business operates. The larger your stake, the
more you stand to gain from the business’ decisions. One can decrease the denominator in two
analogous ways. First, one can limit the ability of others to become among the stakeholders.
Fewer stakeholders means fewer claimants to the business’ pie. And second, one can work to
make others’ stakes as small as possible. With others’ receiving smaller slices, more of the pie is
left for one to gain.

A theory of business ethics that creates these incentives need not explicitly deny that individuals
are the owners of private, and thus exclusive property. It can grant this while claiming, for
instance, that the owners of said property ought to use stakeholder theory as their guide for
action. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable tension between the two ideas. For the dynamic
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created by stakeholder theory precisely reproduces the tragedy of the commons-situation
discussed above. And this tragedy was the very reason for defending property rights on the
property-to-person approach.

Stakeholder theory thus threatens to undo the very solution property rights were supposed to
provide. It encourages behavior that renders our ends zero-sum or rival once again. Your gain
comes at my expense, and my gain means you must lose. It follows that the more a firm’s
decisions become a matter of weighing the interests of various stakeholders, the more those
holders’ stakes come to stand in conflict. This is to make everybody’s business everybody’s
business. And when everybody’s business is everybody’s business, tragedies of the commons
arise.12

None of this is to say, of course, that it is wrong for businesses to take the interests of
stakeholders into account. As said above, part of the point of property is to empower owners to
decide how they want to use their possessions, and they can – and sometimes should – exercise
their rights for the benefit of others. There is a place in our lives for rights and duties, and there is
a place for virtue and plain old decency. But we must not lose sight of the place of these
demands. The ethics of business cannot override or undercut the central motivation of the kind of
property rights on which companies, exchange, and productivity are based in the first place.

Essential Readings
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The most important treatment of property rights remains chapter V of John Locke’s Second
Treatise of Government (1988 [1698]). A great overview and critical discussion of arguments in
favor of private property rights remains Waldron, The Right to Private Property (1988). The
locus classicus for the “tragedy of the commons” is Garrett Hardin’s essay, “The Tragedy of the
Commons” (1968). For discussion on the person-to-property and the property-to-person types of
justification, see my discussion in “What Counts as Original Appropriation?” (2009). For a key
modern discussion that takes the property-to-person approach, see David Schmidtz, “The
Institution of Property” (1994).

For further reading in this volume on whether stakeholder theory is compatible with business
ownership, see chapter 13, “What is Business?” For a consideration of the moral scope of
stakeholder thinking, see chapter 11, “Stakeholder Thinking.” On property and its relation to the
forms of the corporation see chapter 14, “The Corporation: Genesis, Identity, Agency” and
chapter 15, “Alternative Business Organizations and Social Enterprise.” For a discussion of
market and non-market responses to environmental problems, see chapter 22, “Business, Nature,
and Environmental Sustainability.” On freedom of contract in employment relations, see chapter
28, “Employee Ethics and Rights.” On Mahatma Gandhi’s conception of property, see chapter
36, “Business Ethics in South Asia: Gandhian Trusteeship and its Relevance for the Twenty-First
Century.” On the social and moral effects of collectivization, including the idea of a “property
deficit,” see chapter 39, “Business Ethics in Transition: Communism to Commerce in Central
Europe and Russia.” On the relevance of property to the development of business in Africa, see
chapter 37, “Business Ethics in Africa.”

34

35
Bibliography

Attas, D. (2006). “Fragmenting Property,” Law and Philosophy 25, 119-49.

Deaton, A. (2015). The Great Escape. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dodd, E.M. Jr (1932). “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” Harvard Law Review 45,
1145-1163.

Donaldson, T. and L. E. Preston (1995). “The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts,
Evidence, and Implications,” Academy of Management Review 20, 65-91.

Freeman, R.E. (1998). “A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation,” in M. B. E. Clarkson
(ed.), The Corporation and its Stakeholders (University of Toronto Press, Toronto), pp. 125–138.

Freeman, R.E. (2009). “Managing for Stakeholders,” InT. L. Beauchamp, N. E. Bowie, and D.
G. Arnold (eds.). Ethical Theory and Business (8th Edition). New Jersey: Pearson, pp. 56-68.

Fried, B. (2004). “Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32: 6692.

Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press. Fortieth
Anniversary Edition.

35

36

Grey, T.C. (1980). “The Disintegration of Property,” In: J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.).
Nomos XXII: Property. New York: New York University Press.

Hansmann, H. (1996). The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Hardin, G. (1968). “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, 1243–8.

Hegel, G.W. F. (1967 [1821]). The Philosophy of Right. T.M. Knox (trans.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Hohfeld, W.N. (1919). Fundamental Legal Conceptions, W. Cook (ed.). New Haven: Yale
University Press.

Honore, A.M. (1961). “Ownership,” In A.G. Guest (ed.). Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 107-47.

Hume, D. (1978 [1739]). A Treatise of Human Nature. L.A. Selby–Bigge and P. H. Nidditch
(eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Locke, J. (1988 [1698]). Two Treatises of Government. Peter Laslett (ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

36

37
Marx, K. (1978 [1843]). “On the Jewish Question,” In: R. Tucker (ed.). The Marx-Engels
Reader. New York: Norton & Company, pp. 26 - 46.

Mitchell, R.K., B. R. Agle, and D. J. Wood (1997). “Toward a Theory of Stakeholder
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts,” The
Academy of Management Review 22:4, 853–886.

Mossoff, A. ed. (2013). Intellectual Property and Property Rights. Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar.

Murphy, L. and T. Nagel (2004). The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pogge, T. (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights. Polity Press.

Railton, P. (1985). “Locke, Stock and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution and Risk,” In M.
Gibson (ed.) To Breathe Freely. Tolowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rawls, J. (1999 [1971]). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

37

38
Rose, C. (1996). Property and Persuasion: Essays On The History, Theory, And Rhetoric Of
Ownership. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Rosenberg, A. (2004). “On the Priority of Intellectual Property Rights, Especially in
Biotechnology,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3, 77-95.

Schmidtz, D. (1994). “The Institution of Property,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11:2, 42-62.

Schmidtz, D. (2011). “Property,” in G. Klosko (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of
Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 599-610.

Schmidtz, D. and E. Willott (2008). “Reinventing the Commons: An African Case Study,” In D.
Schmidtz. Person, Polis, Planet: Essays in Applied Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 211-227.

Singer, P. (1972) “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:3, 229-243

van der Vossen, B. (2009). “What Counts as Original Appropriation?” Politics, Philosophy and
Economics 8, 355-373.

Waldron, J. (1988). The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

38

39

1

Hohfeld proposed an analytical understanding of rights as relations between parties. On this

analysis, one party’s liberty-right (sometimes called a privilege) to something entails the absence
of a claim-right in another to the same thing. A claim-right to something, further, entails a duty
for another party to that thing. (Consequently, a party’s liberty-right to do something entails that
the same party does not have a duty not to do it.) Third, a power-right denotes a party’s ability to
change a juridical or moral relation in some party. When one party has a power, this entails a
liability for some party (a liability to have their juridical or moral position changed by the powerholder). Finally, an immunity-right protects one against the use of a power. When one has an
immunity, some party has a disability (i.e. the absence of a power to change the immunityholder’s juridical or moral relation).

2

Alexei Marcoux has suggested to me that early stakeholder-theoretic criticisms of equity

owners’ claims to management’s fiduciary care might be interpreted as person-to-property
arguments in negative form. That is, they deny that shareholders in a corporation possess the
morally relevant features that would justify a property right in the firm being managed in their
interests because (for example) they lack a morally substantial relationship to the success of the
firm.

3

This sets aside even more vexing questions about whether corporations can possess the kind of

morally significant free will that gives this argument its punch.

4

See Columbus-American Discovery Group Inc. v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 1992 (974, F. 2d

450-4th Cie 1992)

39

40

5

Perhaps a hard-nosed friend of the person-to-property approach might insist that these kinds of

ownership, too, should be abolished. But this just seems silly. If we are going to accept a robust
system of property rights at all, there is little point in restricting it to only those for which there is
a direct connection with labor, the will, or what have you.

6

Thanks to Alexei Marcoux for pointing this out to me.

7

Compare the way the common law treats questions about who owns a wild animal killed in a

hunt: the person who pursues the animal by giving chase or the person who killed and carried it
away when it happened by him? The classic case here is Pierson v. Post (3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am.
Dec. 264; N.Y. 1805), decided on appeal in favor of Pierson, the person who killed the fox
pursued by Post. Or consider the related question about who owns gas that is extracted from a
field spanning multiple people’s properties. Here, the party who captures the gas is considered
the owner. In both cases, the justification that’s offered for the rule takes a clear property-toperson form, namely the socially beneficial use of natural resources. For related discussion, see
Rose (1996).

8

Thus Hume emphasized that even though property rights mean that I cannot just take what I

want or need, “it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided
he will act in the same manner with regard to me” (Hume (1978 [1739]), book III, part II, sec. II)
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9 Hume, of course, thought that there was an important difference between rights over our
persons and rights over our possessions. The latter were “conventional” in the sense that they
come into existence only after a certain man-made practice is in place, the former “natural” in
that they require no such thing. This distinction is often confused for the view that our property
rights are somehow less secure than our other rights. Nothing of the kind follows from Hume’s
argument. (See Hume, (Hume (1978 [1739]), book III)

10

Thanks to Alexei Marcoux for helpfully putting the point this way.

11

While he did not put his point in terms of the patent system, the idea here is analogous to a

famous argument by Peter Singer. In his discussion of the moral significance of famines around
the world, Singer argued that if we can save a person’s life without giving up something of moral
significance, then we ought to do it. This means that relatively rich people (people like you and
me, that is) ought to give away what we own up to the point that saving another life no longer
justifies the sacrifice we are about to make. At the limit, this might endanger property rights as
well. As Singer put it: “the prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society
must be considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our society”
(Singer 1972, p. 237).

12

Sometimes stakeholder theorists argue that the demands on business are limited because the

business cannot be required to trade them off against each other. (Freeman, 2009, p. 66) But this
does not remove the problem, as we face a kind of arms race to get one’s stake as large as
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possible as quickly as possible. The result is the same: wastefully maximized demands,
dependencies, and zero-sum interaction.
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